Key Takeaways
- In November 2025, German respondents rated EU and NATO members highest. Sweden ranks first with 63% more respondents classifying it as an ally than as a threat.
- Five countries have more German respondents classifying them as threats than as allies. These are Russia (−55%), Iran (−45%), Belarus (−40%), China (−29%), and Saudi Arabia (−11%).
- Russia sits furthest from neutral. Its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 struck directly at the post-war European security order.
- German respondents’ perceptions of other countries as allies and threats in 2025 are largely shaped by the war in Ukraine.
The Munich Security Index 2026 tracks how people across G7 and BICS nations perceive other countries.
For Germany, the data shows the share of German respondents saying a country is an ally minus the share saying it is a threat. A positive figure means more respondents classify the country as an ally. A negative figure means more respondents classify it as a threat.
German Respondents’ Perceptions of Other Countries as Allies and Threats
| Country | Share saying ally minus share saying threat (%) |
|---|---|
| Sweden | +63 |
| France | +61 |
| Finland | +60 |
| Italy | +59 |
| Canada | +55 |
| United Kingdom | +55 |
| Australia | +50 |
| Poland | +46 |
| Japan | +43 |
| Ukraine | +29 |
| South Korea | +25 |
| Hungary | +18 |
| Brazil | +17 |
| Taiwan | +17 |
| United States | +16 |
| South Africa | +14 |
| Moldova | +13 |
| Georgia | +10 |
| India | +8 |
| Israel | +7 |
| Turkey | +2 |
| Saudi Arabia | −11 |
| China | −29 |
| Belarus | −40 |
| Iran | −45 |
| Russia | −55 |
Source: Munich Security Conference Security Report 2026
The Munich Security Index 2026 draws on representative samples of around 1,000 adults from each of the G7 nations (e.g., Canada, France, Germany) and BICS nations (e.g., Brazil, Russia, India, China), totalling 11,099 respondents. The margin of error is 3.1 percentage points.
Which Countries Do German Respondents Most Perceive as Allies?
Sweden ranks first among all 26 countries measured, with 63% more German respondents classifying it as an ally than as a threat.
Aside from Sweden, German respondents’ strongest ally perceptions cluster around EU and NATO members:
- Sweden (63%)
- France (61%)
- Finland (60%)
- Italy (59%)
- Canada (55%)
- United Kingdom (55%)
- Australia (50%)
These countries share overlapping characteristics that matter to German respondents:
- Stable democratic governance
- Formal alliance membership through NATO or the EU
- An active role in European security
Sweden and Finland are instructive examples. Both joined NATO in 2023 and 2024, respectively, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Their accession brought them into the alliance’s collective defence commitments. This likely reinforced their standing in German respondents’ perceptions.
None of these countries crosses the +70% mark. Germany has historically favoured a multilateral, institution-based approach to foreign policy. Divergences on defence spending, migration, and Middle East policy exist even within allied relationships. Those frictions keep the ceiling lower than unconditional trust would suggest.
Which Countries Do German Respondents Most Perceive as Threats?
Five countries have more German respondents classifying them as threats than as allies. Russia ranks last at −55%. Its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 struck directly at the post-war European security order. German public opinion has not softened since.
The remaining four have each contributed to similar geopolitical tensions:
- Iran (−45%): Iran supplied Russia with drones used to attack Ukraine. Its nuclear programme remains a concern. It is reinforced by US-Israeli strikes on its facilities in June 2025.
- Belarus (−40%): Belarus allowed Russian troops to launch their 2022 invasion of Ukraine from Belarusian territory. It has functioned as a direct extension of Russian military operations.
- China (−29%): Bilateral China-Russia trade reached a record USD 244.8 billion in 2024. This is partly driven by dual-use goods exports widely viewed as helping sustain Russia’s war effort.
- Saudi Arabia (−11%): Saudi Arabia has not joined Western sanctions against Russia. However, it continues to coordinate with Moscow on oil policy, even as the relationship reflects strategic tensions and diverging interests.
German respondents’ perceptions of other countries as allies and threats in November 2025 are largely shaped by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Countries that anchored themselves to the European security response after 2022 gained ground. Countries that undermined it or stayed neutral while enabling Russia did not.
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References
- https://securityconference.org/assets/02_Dokumente/01_Publikationen/2026/MSR2026/MSC_2026_MSI.pdf
- https://securityconference.org/en/publications/analyses/after-the-end-of-certainties-public-opinion-on-the-zeitenwende/
- https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/european-cohesion-security-and-defense
- https://koerber-stiftung.de/site/assets/files/34928/theberlinpulse2022_2023.pdf
- https://www.deutschland.de/en/topic/politics/multilateralism-as-the-guiding-principle-of-german-foreign-policy
- https://www.euronews.com/next/2025/06/25/drone-debris-found-in-ukraine-indicates-russia-is-using-new-technology-from-iran
- https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2025-07/news/israel-and-us-strike-irans-nuclear-program
- http://www.irjournal.pl/pdf-216238-133846?filename=133846.pdf
- https://nhc.no/en/the-role-of-belarus-in-the-war-in-ukraine/
- https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/071824-saudi-arabia-russia-to-maintain-close-coordination-on-opec-kremlin
- https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russian-push-opec-action-pause-met-no-saudi-resistance-sources-say-2025-11-03/
- https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/behind-opec-oil-output-hike-saudi-russian-tensions-simmer-2025-06-02/





