Key Takeaways
- Germany’s net ally/threat perception of the United States fell 15 percentage points between 2024 and 2025. It is the steepest single-country decline in the dataset.
- Israel recorded the second-steepest decline at 12 percentage points. Both drops followed Donald Trump’s re-election and German unease over US-backed military operations in the Middle East.
- China (+6), Saudi Arabia (+2), and Iran (+2) all improved in German perception despite being formally regarded as strategic-risk actors in Berlin.
- Hungary’s net ally/threat perception fell 3 percentage points despite EU membership. Governance quality and foreign policy alignment shaped German perceptions independently of bloc membership.
- The overall pattern reflects a transactional foreign policy lens. Germans evaluate partners by behaviour and policy alignment more than by formal alliance status or geographic proximity.
Change in Germans’ Net Ally-Threat Share
| Country | Net Ally-Threat Share (In %) | Change (In %) |
|---|---|---|
| China | -29 | +6 |
| Canada | 55 | +5 |
| Australia | 50 | +4 |
| Japan | 43 | +4 |
| Sweden | 63 | +3 |
| France | 61 | +3 |
| United Kingdom | 55 | +3 |
| India | 8 | +3 |
| Saudi Arabia | -11 | +2 |
| Finland | 60 | +2 |
| Iran | -45 | +2 |
| Ukraine | 29 | +1 |
| Russia | -55 | +1 |
| South Africa | 14 | 0 |
| Turkey | 2 | 0 |
| Poland | 46 | -1 |
| South Korea | 25 | −1 |
| Brazil | 17 | -1 |
| Italy | 59 | -2 |
| Georgia | 10 | −2 |
| Hungary | 18 | −3 |
| Moldova | 13 | -3 |
| Taiwan | 17 | −5 |
| Belarus | -40 | −6 |
| Israel | 7 | −12 |
| United States | 16 | −15 |
*Net balance of the share of German respondents’ responses (In %) saying a country is an ally minus those classifying it as a threat. For this article, we’ll refer to these net balances as “net ally/threat balance or perceptions“. Countries with positive values will be called “net allies”, and those with negative values will be “net threats”.
Source: Munich Security Conference Security Report 2026
The Munich Security Index 2026 draws on representative samples of around 1,000 adults from each of the G7 nations (e.g., Canada, France, Germany) and BICS nations (e.g., Brazil, Russia, India, China), totalling 11,099 respondents. The margin of error is 3.1 percentage points.
Between 2024 and 2025, Germany’s view of several close formal allies deteriorated. Germans simultaneously became less wary of some countries they had previously rated as threats.
Net ally/threat balance is the share of respondents who classify a country as an ally minus those who classify it as a threat.
The US and Israel Recorded the Steepest Declines in German Net Ally-Threat Balance
Germany’s net ally/threat perception of the United States fell 15 percentage points between 2024 and 2025. It is the steepest single-country decline in the dataset. Israel’s perception fell 12 percentage points. It is the second-steepest.
Respondents across nearly all G7 and BICS countries rated the United States as a greater risk in 2025 than in 2024. The shift accelerated after Donald Trump’s re-election.
Three factors drove the US decline in German perception:
- Renewed US pressure on European defence spending
- Friction over Ukraine policy
- German unease over US-backed military operations in the Middle East
For Israel, the 12-point decline reflects the same dynamics. German unease over military operations in the Middle East deepened. Israel’s close alignment with US foreign policy under the Trump administration reinforced distrust of both countries simultaneously.
China, Saudi Arabia, and Iran All Rose in German Perception
Three countries formally regarded as strategic-risk actors in Berlin improved their standing in German perception: China (+6), Saudi Arabia (+2), and Iran (+2).
The pattern reflects a pragmatic distinction between political discomfort and strategic necessity.
China is Germany’s largest trading partner. Economic ties set a floor on disengagement even as strategic rivalry grows.
Germany and Saudi Arabia have been developing a green hydrogen supply corridor, targeting 200,000 tonnes in annual exports to Germany by 2030. Saudi Arabia’s strategic value as an energy partner is growing.
Iran recorded the smallest improvement at +2 percentage points. The data does not point to a clear bilateral explanation for the shift.
Germany does not fully disengage from key regional actors. It evaluates partners by strategic and economic utility alongside formal political standing.
EU Membership Did Not Shield Hungary from a Decline in German Perceptions
Hungary’s net ally/threat perception fell 3 percentage points. Germany has documented concerns over Hungary’s rule of law record, judicial independence, and democratic backsliding. These issues have been raised repeatedly in EU-level proceedings.
France, also an EU member, improved by 3 percentage points. The contrast points to the same conclusion. EU membership alone does not determine how Germany views a partner. Governance direction and policy alignment shape perceptions within the bloc, as they do outside it.
Germany’s shifting perceptions reflect a consistent evaluation logic. Formal allies that act in ways that unsettle European security lose standing. Strategic competitors that remain economically indispensable hold theirs.
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References
- https://securityconference.org/assets/02_Dokumente/01_Publikationen/2026/MSR2026/MSC_2026_MSI.pdf
- https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2025/11/24/german-views-of-the-u-s-germany-relationship-turn-sharply-negative/
- https://www.dw.com/en/germany-voter-trust-in-us-and-israel-decreasing/a-72796059
- https://securityconference.org/publikationen/munich-security-report/2026/munich-security-index-2026/
- https://lnep.ewapub.com/article/view/6730
- https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/07/28/on-defence-france-and-germany-are-inching-closer-but-remain-far-apart
- https://ip-quarterly.com/en/persistent-lack-strategic-convergence-between-france-and-germany
- https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20251103IPR31237/hungary-s-rule-of-law-crisis-is-deepening-civil-liberties-committee-meps-warn
- https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/germany-saudi-arabia-seal-energy-partnership-companies-launch-hydrogen-supply-deals
- https://www.deutschland.de/en/news/reiche-energy-partnership-with-saudi-arabia
